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to function as an individual. 3 Its curious place in a dictionary definition is matched in the wider world.
There is no innately shared understanding of the term across disciplines, either those focussed upon law and governance in the Nation State, beyond the Nation State. Moreover, despite its ostensible centrality to the study of institutions and their evolution in the European context, there is little by way of legal literature focussed upon the European Union, centrally considering the concept of 'institutionalisation.' The first meaning above probably dominates many understandings thereof but the others are, as will be argued here, arguably far from irrelevant. Some of these meanings carrying innately negative and positive connotations of conduct or activity whereas others just suggest coherent development and form difficult 'media' for analysis. As Reisnik reminds us, 'is-(or US 'iz'-)ation'
has become affixed to so many English-language words that it has lost much of its force as an identifier with meaning. 4 Institutionalisation is argued, however, here to 'matter ', because organisations that incorporate 'institutionalised' practices, ideals or systems are understood to be more legitimate, successful and likely to succeed.
5
In an era where major parts of the world wish to leave or threaten to leave international organisations (African Union from the ICC, UK from the Council of Europe and European Union, US from WTO or UN), we may now even be entering some form of grand era of wholesale de-institutionalisation, albeit such a claim is difficult to prove or evaluate at this moment in time. Developments in the relationship between the EU and US in recent times may not perfectly correspond to these 'critical junctions' in the global legal order, if we can call them that. The reality may be more settled or less far-reaching. However, this account explores the incomplete reality of just one particular case study against this highly esoteric backdrop.
In many subjects and disciplines, institutionalisation features as part of its lexicon, of a 'process', but not necessarily with any scientific definition. 6 Institutionalisation is used sometimes as a 'term of art' beyond any need for explanation or as evidence. 7 The study of institutionalisation additionally presents an empirical problem of 'context' perhaps because it requires a form, context or entity for its study. There is also a tendency across subjects and disciplines to humanise or personify institutions in efforts to focus upon their actorness, especially in legal scholarship, which also complicates matters. 8 In the context of the Nation State, scholars tend to place much emphasis upon collective agency and action with respect to institutionalisation. Here, institutionalisation can be defined as the process by which a practice or organisation becomes 'well-established' or 'well-known' in defined communities.
Consequently, the development of expectations, orientations and behaviour can cement on the basis that this practice or organisation will prevail in the foreseeable future amongst a community. 9 In certain subjects, such as public administration, democratisation may even act as a proxy for institutionalisation in a Nation State. 10 This tendency is far less evident in the context of, for example, the European Union or beyond the Nation State but still shows the reach of the term and its creeping analytical tentacles.
Beyond the Nation State, the rising incidence of the delegation by Member States of authority to international organisations, the mushrooming of international organisations, the exponential growth of transnational non-governmental organisations (NGO's) and the increase of majority-voting in international organisations, are charted examples of its existence and evolution. 11 
Institutionalisation beyond the Nation State is often regarded as an antidote to concerns about the delegation of authority
beyond the Nation State. 12 One might argue that in the transnational context, idea of institutionalisation is the study of the belief in publicness, openness and even public institutions. 13 
This is because institutions may provide certainty, clarity and possibly even some form of humanity and appease the uncertainty of transfers of authority to ostensibly faceless global institutional actors.
It thus relates to the faith in the authority of institutions beyond the Nation State, often as a locus for legitimacy or their legitimation. rectifying the mistakes of the past, especially as to its multiples crises. 15 By opting for public institutions and institutionalisation, for example, within TTIP, it attempted to shift away from the noninstitutionalisation of transatlantic relations in order to enhance the transparency and the 'governability' of transatlantic relations through institutions, discussed below. In other areas of recent intense cooperation, such as data privacy, they appear to short significantly short of institutionalisation.
In the European context, the EU has a recent history of promoting and nudging institutional multilateral innovations, from the International Criminal Court, a UN Ombudsman to a Multilateral Investment Court in its efforts to promote internationalisation, accountability, legitimacy and the rule of law as a broad global agenda. The EU was also recently an active participant in the so-called 'mega-regionals', where EU-US transatlantic relations would have been subsumed within a broader geopolitic shift outside of the WTO, through 'new' forms of institutional arrangements. 16 In scholarship, institutionalisation arguably has a slightly narrower and less 'glamourous' meaning,
where it is used both as a 'bottom-up' understanding of European integration to understand the European Space and to contextualise the development of distinct policy fields, often in foreign policy, which raises very specific notions of community. 17 Institutionalisation here is understood as the complementary processes of formalisation and stabilisation of procedures, institutional coordination and the ability of individual actors to influence institutional development. 18 Institutionalisation here often appears syllogistically as an outcome rather than a mode of analysis or theory per se. For example, it is said that the greater the difficulty in refining the established governance structures and procedures, the more stable the governance arrangements are and the more institutionalized the policy area is. 
6
In the context of the EU, it is worth remarking that the study of institutionalisation often appears as a study of formalism and formality which ironically mostly looks behind formality. In this regard, vast networks of public and private actors, transatlantic actors, representatives of Member State governments, firms lobbying organisations, and the EU institutions, and its many agencies, all operate in the EU political space. They change its rules and practices actively and dynamically on a regular basis. This is not surprising given that the EU Treaties are living legal documents, where interinstitutional agreements and practices can autonomously evolve and change. In the EU, bodies can becomes formal legal institutions of the EU previously who were not. Quasi-agencies may become regularised by the stroke of a pen, for example, as has occurred with respect to Europol or Eurojust. In fact, one could even argue that institutionalisation does not strictly matter in the EU, which has demonstrated incredible flexibility towards the grant of legal personality and the creation of new entities in its treaties outside of strictly formal parameters, exhibiting the need for institutionalisation to be considered outside of formalism or formality. 28 It suggests a more nuanced account of law and institutionalisation processes and procedures is required. These issues lead to a more substantive analysis here.
THE FOCUS OF THIS BOOK ON INSTITUTIONALISATION: DEVELOPING A RESEARCH

AGENDA
This book explores how we should understand the development of institutionalisation beyond the Nation State. It focuses largely but not exclusively upon a possibly 'hard case' of global governance, EU-US relations, long understood to be a non-institutionalised space, in light of recent legal and political developments in data and trade law, drawing from a range of scholars of various disciplines and subject areas. The book reflects upon two core case studies that are far from disconnected or unrelated data and trade, broadly defined. It deploys the EU-US TTIP negotiations for its trade case study generally and also explores trade in a wider sense, reflecting upon the place of institutions in law-making and global governance and beyond the Nation State. As to data, in the transatlantic context, it was taken out of the TTIP negotiations and so it is largely considered here separately or apart therefrom. It is considered in its broadest iteration as to data flows, transparency and privacy, so as to accurately capture its conceptual dimensions vis-à-vis practice in transatlantic relations.
However, the intricacies and inter-relations of the topics are not overlooked or ignored and instead are considered apart as much as possible for reasons of coherence, albeit that both are understood to be 7 a highly distinctive case study of quasi-institutionalisation or less, in particular in the areas of trade and data law. It argues overall that legal accounts of institutionalisation tend to be concerned with technical and procedural questions of enforcement and legal regimes, whereas non-legal accounts tend to be exclusively concerned with power dynamics. The book reflects as a result upon their interrelationship and the place of process here in our analytical frame. It argues that a careful understanding of the relationship between the local and global is required here.
The contributors to this book have been asked to consider a series of questions and themes, which are as follows: The account which follows next outlines briefly select features of recent transatlantic developments in trade, data and privacy. As noted above, the case studies selected in this account overlap to a significant degree trade drives data and vice versa. Nonetheless, this account studies TTIP in detail, which excluded data from its reach, followed by data, information and privacy. The negotiation of TTIP have been conducted autonomously from data developments thus are capable being distinguished analytically. The EU's most 'progressive' trade deal yet, the EU-Canada Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA), is also analysed here in many contributors accounts because of its express links to TTIP, textual and political along with global governance developments more broadly.
Arguably, strong internationalised institutionalisation appears as the outcome of the trade case study, with significant concerns for good governance and fundamental rights to dominate both the regulatory cooperation and investment court reform proposals. By contrast, extremely weak localised institutionalisation appears the outcome for the data privacy case study, with much weaker commitments to good governance and fundamental rights. followed by an analysis of the two main case studies of the account in trade and data privacy, without prejudice to or without due regard being had of more specialised and nuanced accounts in this collection on the topics.
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND (NON) INSTITUTIONALISATION
Overview
One 38 The USTR Annual Report for 2016 issued in 2017 outlined in brief how the US was reviewing the state of the TTIP negotiations and key points of differences remaining between the parties. The swift rejection of the TPP by the Trump administration and its apparent favour of bilateralism and 'American First' may possibly change the existing evolving dynamic in the future, perhaps even radically, although this remains yet to be seen.
Integration through Dialogues
Historically, Transatlantic Relations have evolved in a series of official and permanent dialogues that arguably intersect many of these categories. 39 The permanent dialogues include the Transatlantic 
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11 regularised and structured process of non-institutional law-making. They are perceived, however, to have given certain economic actors privileged access to policy makers at the expense of other sectors of 'transatlantic society'. 44 This leads to a discussion of the idea of society qua community through law.
A Transatlantic Civil Society?
It has long been a matter of debate whether it could be claimed that some form of Transatlantic Civil Society as a sociological or scientific phenomenon has ever existed. There has been much cooperation between civil society across the Atlantic since the 19th century to the present day, on topics ranging from peace to slavery. Nevertheless, this category of a Transatlantic Civil Society is more complex, subjective and perhaps multifarious. Given the differences in how US and EU interest groups are organised, it cannot be a surprise that the different dialogues have struggled, to differing degrees. 45 However, civil society participation is now becoming a key constitutional norm of the EU polity, with interesting repercussions in international relations. 46 The history of the participation of civil society in EU-US relations has arguably been to privilege private actors in secret dialogue processes. 47 The institutionalisation of civil society participation within the form of an Advisory Group within the TTIP architecture is a notable -and late -step in the negotiations but also evident in other recent areas of collaboration e.g. EU-US Cybercrime and security cooperation and may change our view thereof. 48 International institutions that are politicised often respond by giving greater access to transnational non-state actors to increase their legitimacy and in this regard, the TTIP negotiations followed such a pattern. 49 However, with widened participation in the TTIP negotiations, an agenda for deeper and more extensive institutionalisation ambiguously trailed behind and synergies between the two may not be apparent. . 55 Arguably it envisaged an executive dominated structure of officials tasks with charting TTIP's evolution, through an annual Regulatory Cooperation programme, to outline priorities, suggest new joint initiatives, with reviews only at ministerial level regularly, reporting to the EU-US Summit to legislators every two years, thereby skewing political accountability. 56 e.g. natural or legal persons may jointly submit concrete and sufficiently substantiated proposal, including from public interest bodies (Article x 5 (2)).
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previous proposals for ex ante horizontal review between regulators) then began to raise concerns as to the cost and workability of such levels of participation. 57 On whatever view, this form of proposed institutionalisation reached after 15 rounds of negotiation differs from historical EU-US regulatory cooperation and makes it remark-worthy. Still, a considerably weaker, looser form of institutionalisation became the core of the negotiations, by way of its lexicon. 58 There is a risk at the low-key representation of institutionalisation, deformalizing the architecture and processes of rule-making at the same time. Much naturally depends upon the relationship between a cooperation structure and the executive structure and it turn its relationship with the implementation at domestic level.
The absence of direct effect of the Agreement was explicitly outlined in Article X.14 and it leads to a question as to enforceability of rights through redress and review mechanism and the discussion next turns to the issue of redress and review and TTIP. protections constitute significant and diverse examples. 61 Critics have long contended that it unjustifiably privileges investors, over the host state in its exercise its regulatory powers, usually developing countries. 62 A proposal for bilateral institutionalisation thereof has been made initially within the context of the TTIP negotiations, but has also been applied more broadly by the EU initially to the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EUVietnam Free Trade Agreement, who have accepted its inclusion. 63 The EU has now sought to confer unprecedented legitimacy upon investor-state dispute settlement through its proposed reform in the form of a permanent International Investment Court System (ICS).
In a public consultation on the merits thereof, many had expressed their opposition to ISDS in TTIP,
given the existence of reliable local courts available to solve disputes. 64 The strength of opposition and polarization of views resulted in the Commission promising wholesale reforms of the adjudication system, not exclusively with respect to TTIP, albeit still including it within TTIP. 65 The Commission thus published a Concept Paper 'Investment in TTIP and beyond-the path for reform' thereafter. 66 In this proposal, the Commission sought to explore the creation of a permanent and public International Investment Court and a future multilateral system and bring transparency and permanency to the Court, especially as the inclusion of independent professional judges, largely through the application of public international law principles. 67 In February 2016, the European Commission agreed with the Canadian Government to amend the controversial investment protection clause to take on board the EU's new approach to investment and dispute settlement. It made provision for a permanent institutionalised dispute settlement tribunal which has taken on greater vibrancy than in TTIP. Its inclusion within CETA was trialled as a forerunner to the TTIP negotiations and its acceptance by Canada as a highly developed was intended as a means to 'legitimise' its inclusion in the US negotiations. In order to appease the Wallonian The Commission has been carrying out a detailed impact assessment on this initiative in early 2017
and it is principally considering how to model a multilateral court. 70 A concerted strategy to unify an ad hoc system through a new institution currently governed by over 3.000 bilateral treaties must be stated to be ambitious and 'global' in scope and has generated a global debate. 71 The shift from ad hoc adjudication appears predicated on a process and formalisation through institutionalisation, breaking ranks with the traditional place of investment dispute settlements origins in commercial arbitration.
Institutionalisation here is then said to shift the framework to a treaty party analysis rather than a disputing party one and the institutionalisation then is sought to reset the imbalance of interests and rights. 72 The question has arisen as to how the proposed institutionalisation of the Court in this format skews the traditional biases between States and investors on the basis that such a Court would be 'biased' against investors because of the judges would be selected by States. It is an important point to reflect upon in so far as it is commonly thought that transnational legal orders often fail to be institutionalised because States become sites of resistance to transnational legal norms. 73 Here, however, the number of interests involved and corrosive relationship of the existing legal framework of international investment law with State sovereignty (e.g. having to accept enormous arbitral awards) appears to make States more inclined to institutionalise to protect their sovereignty even within a multilateral framework, rather than resist, as might more usually be protected. It is thus a far from atypical story of institutionalisation, as a clear study of strong institutionalisation through formalisation. There are important features of this story, as one of procedural and substantive multilateralism which are explored in detail in several accounts in this volume. 
Overview
The area of EU-US data flows and privacy is an important case study of transatlantic relations as it represents shifts in novel forms of governance. 75 To an outsider, stronger institutionalisation of transatlantic privacy policy might appear to be the next logical step in light of the importance of transatlantic data flows. In the past, the EU and US have set up multiple forms of transatlantic institutions but not based upon a shared consensus of privacy and instead with a learning or evolving remit to evolve privacy. Transatlantic relations in the area of data and privacy have mostly relied upon domestic institutions, in recent or historical forms of agreement. As noted above, TTIP, the largest scale form of transatlantic collaboration in recent history expressly excluded data flows from its negotiations. Still, data flows are extremely salient from economic, legal and political perspectives and relates to a high degree to the concept of information and information structures of society. The institutionalisation of EU-US data flows and data privacy alleged to be taking place in recent times is vigorously contested, as it appears to pivot away from the looser decentralisation prevailing until recently, to some extent at least, and this forms a specific line of enquiry for this book. 76 The EU-US Privacy Shield has recently come into force, as a legal instrument which is intended to replace the US Safe Harbour Agreement, and specifically to address the concerns around data collection and privacy that arose in the case of Schrems v European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) after the NSA, Snowdon and PRISM revelations. 77 It has spurred the development of other instruments and enforcement regimes, such as an EU-US Umbrella Agreement and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It raises significant questions surrounding the meaning of institutionalisation and non-institutionalisation in this context. Whether it is now any more institutionalised and a less effective mode of governance remains to be seen but it appears as study of modest institutional innovations taking place at transnational level despite grander ambitions: a difficult mismatch. It thus forms a ripe case study for consideration here.
EU-US Safe Harbour to the EU-US Privacy Shield
The Safe Harbour Agreement was an important departure for transatlantic relations with a so-called 'hybrid' style governance. It was predicated upon non-institutionalisation because private actors took the lead in coordinating arrangements in a loose form of de facto harmonisation of social standards. The CJEU invalidated Safe Harbour without any direction as to its temporary effects and thus ostensibly changed the institutional dynamic significantly. 84 However, subsequent EU legislation in the form of the GDPR appears to have backed away from this outcome. The initial outcome of Schrems was to subvert the claim that the internet could be free from regulatory capture, 'Barlow-esque'. 85 It is notable how Schrems is perceived as having bucked with a traditional EU 'trend' towards centralisation and instead in promoting institutional configurations which would empower national supervisory authorities and national courts. However, matters have gone 'full circle', through and by institutions and processes of institutionalisation ironically, to protect the individual from institutional domination.
EU-US Privacy Shield
A new replacement for Safe Harbour emerged in the form of the EU-US Privacy Shield agreement was announced and adopted in 2016, in a byzantine compilation of documents. 86 It purports to follow Safe Harbour with modest institutional innovations and largely replicating the self-certification approach of Safe Harbour. As regards its substantive content, its structure and substance may be said to leave a lot to be desired, scattered across a series of lengthy 'letters'. Its institutionalised dimensions are arguably remain weak and highly 'localised'. 87 The Privacy Shield is perceived to be an improvement upon Safe Harbour, albeit far from optimal because of its localised 'centre of gravity'. The Privacy Shield purports to institutionalise transatlantic data processing through the evolution of oversight layers (DPA, Ombudsman, Judicial authorities) and follows closely existing EU-US data transfer agreements. The Notice provisions are arguably more robust and provide for a broad array of information rights, enforceable at national level. In this regard, DPAs will acquire much significance, whereas US enforcement rests largely with the FTC and appears to strike an imbalance overall through divergent and disparate institutionalisation and enforcement. 88 An
Ombudsman is part of the oversight whose function is to report to the Secretary of State.
Consequently, there are many who argue that insufficient distance exists from the intelligence community that is required for the body to act in an independent manner and not to be a true Ombudsman. As a result, the Privacy Shield has not met with widespread approval and instead, broad condemnation from the Article 29 Working Party, the EDPS and the European Parliament.
EU-US Umbrella Agreement
EU-US negotiations on a harmonised data protection agreement for the transfer of data for law enforcement purposes have been on slow-burn for some time until the NSA revelations. Its content aside, its status as an international agreement pursuant to Articles 216 and 218 TFEU has raised the most concern as a limiting characteristic with respect to judicial review by the CJEU. 89 The lack of equivalent protection for EU nationals under US privacy law was deemed to be a significant hurdle to a finding of adequacy or adequate protection of fundamental rights under EU law for some time. As a result, changes were eventually introduced to permit EU citizens qualify for protection under a recent amendment to the 1974 Privacy Act under the Obama administration, 90 the Judicial Redress Act 2015.
However, such developments may be vulnerable to change under the new and possibly more EUhostile US administration. 91 The main oversight mechanisms of the Agreement are at national level in the EU and US (Article 21) respectively. The main accountability functions of the Agreement are set out in the Article 14, which put an onus on authorities to do so appropriately or risk considerable sanctions. It strives to develop a system to facilitate claims in the event of misconduct and thus constitutes some form of looser localised 'institutionalisation' if it can be called that. The Umbrella Agreement does not cover national security measures nor does it deal with inter-agency exchange of information or multiple exceptions for law enforcement purposes, which arguably diminishes much of its promise beyond the
